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Abstract
In a multicommodity life cycle setting with uncertainty and time additive expected utility, this note
￿nds necessary and su¢ cient conditions on preferences for all but one optimal decision each period to be
independent of the future and of uncertainty.
JEL No: D1, D9, E2
Keywords: Multivariate life cycle, Euler equations.
The standard life cycle paradigm used in applications has expected discounted time additive utility as
the payo⁄ function and an intertemporal budget constraint that works period to period with one or more
￿nancial assets. Uncertainty can be over future preferences or prices, wages and asset returns. This approach
has had well documented empirical failures and various modi￿cations have been suggested: habit formation
Constantinides, (1990)), complication of budget constraints with say liquidity constraints (Zeldes (1989))
and more fundamentally alternatives to expected utility such as ambiguity aversion (Klibano⁄ et al (2005)),
preference for ￿ exibility (Kreps (1979)) and behaviourally based theories (Thaler, (1990)), etc. Partly these
last concerns arise from the strong information and computational demands of the standard paradigm: at
any time t the set of states and the probability distribution over them must be known for all future dates. It
is also true that it is extremely di¢ cult to analytically compute an optimal time path of decisions and closed
form solutions exist in only a few cases. Partly this is due to the dimensionality problem, partly it is due to
the types of functions that are commonly used e.g. an intertemporal preference and diminishing marginal
rates of substitution. This has led economists to use simulation methods to determine the optimal path and
also the parameters of the problem (Gourinchas & Parker (2002), Campbell & Cocco (2003), Attanasio et
al (2008))
In a multivariate problem both the information demands and computational complexity increase. In
the standard paradigm there is an Euler equation for each decision (Meghir-Weber (1996)), and the opti-
mal path derives from solving all these Euler equations simultaneously through time. Do decisionmakers
actually struggle with the computational complexity in making decisions? Plausibly some decisions have a
more obvious intertemporal impact than others e.g. it￿ s more likely that decisions with large future e⁄ects
1(education, job choice/search,etc.) will be taken with the life cycle problem in mind but less likely to be so
for choosing whether to have ice cream or cake today. If this is the case then cet par choices made with the
life cycle model in mind should display di⁄erent variability to those taken "myopically". Empirically there is
some evidence that there are di⁄erences in variability of consumption on di⁄erent commodities both at one
age and across the life cycle. In the Appendix Table 1 shows the coe¢ cient of variation of spending (CV)
on 11 main commodity groups for households in the UK 2009 Living Costs and Food Survey Since it is a
cross section, relative prices should be more or less common across observations, families di⁄er in income
and demographics. Life style di⁄erences and nonparticipation is relevant for some goods eg tobacco, fares for
transport, motoring,alcohol and clothing as the number of zero expenditures shows. But still the coe¢ cient
of variation of food and fuel is about half that of other decisions. In the cross section we can see some life
cycle e⁄ects by looking at the coe¢ cient of variation by age of household head. For a few age bands and
goods this is shown in the appendix in Table 2 (CV including zero expenditures). Generally the variability
between households in expenditures peaks in middle age groups but more strongly with more variable goods.
Expenditure decisions made in a life cycle context should in part be determined by intertemporal smooth-
ing of expected income and price changes, preference changes. Myopic or statically determined decisions are
just subject to current resources and preferences. In principle either group could be more volatile than the
other eg if expectations are more or less volatile than realisations. What is clear from the data is that there
are signi￿cant di⁄erences between goods in expenditure volatility, and also some life cycle di⁄erences. Food
and fuel spending is less volatile, leisure goods and services are more volatile.
Here we ￿nd necessary and su¢ cient conditions for within period preferences to be such that using
the standard expected utility life cycle paradigm, some or most decisions are optimally purely static whilst
others must be deduced from solving the full intertemporal problem. Essentially if there are n+1 expenditure
decisions (x1;x2:::xn;c) to be made within the standard paradigm then choice of (x1;x2:::xn) can be made
in a purely static way i⁄each periods utility can be written as u(x1;x2:::xn;c) = F(c+G(x1;x2:::xn)) where
F();G() have suitable properties to ensure monotonicity and concavity.
1 The Basic Paradigm
There are n + 1 consumption goods with quantities each period (x1t;x2t:::xnt;ct). The quantities are pur-
chased at prices qit;i = 1::n for the goods x and pt for the good c: There is a single ￿nancial asset whose
stock at the start of period t is At and which earns a certain interest rate r each period (here for simplicity
of notation we take it to be constant through time). There is transfer income of mt each period t: The e⁄ect
2is that disposable resources at start of t are Zt = (1+r)At+mt: The consumption plan is for a ￿nite horizon




where ￿ is the per period discount factor (again assumed constant) and u() is utility per period (here written
as time invariant).
The value function Vt(At) has the form
Vt(At) = max
ct;xt;At+1
fu(ct;xt) + ￿EtV (At+1)jptct = Zt ￿ ￿qitxit ￿ At+1g
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t+1(At+1) = Etu1(t + 1)
(1 + r)
pt+1
ptct = (1 + r)At + mt ￿ ￿qitxit ￿ At+1 (2)
Using the envelope theorem
V
0
t (At) = u1(t)
(1 + r)
pt
Updating this and taking expectations as at t
EtV
0




u1(t) = ￿(1 + r)Etu1(t + 1)
pt
pt+1








= ￿(1 + r)Etu1(t + 1)
qit
pt+1
= ￿(1 + r)Etui(t + 1)
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3So equivalently in Euler equation form the ￿rst order conditions can also be written
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= ui(t) i = 1::n (4)










Of course optimally At+1 depends on future decisions and uncertainty. But when (4) is independent of c
this e⁄ect disappears. This prompts the result of this paper
Theorem 1 The general solution u(ct;xt) of the equations
ui(ct;xt) ￿ gi(xt)u1(ct;xt) = 0
is
u(ct;xt) = F(ct ￿ G(xt))
where F() is an arbitrary function and Gi(xt) = gi(xt):






hence the mrs between any two goods in x must be independent of c and so c must be separable from x
in u or u = F(c;G(x)): Then u1 = F1 = ui=gi = F2Gi=gi = F2Gj=gj = uj=gj which implies that gi(x) is
proportional to gj(x) say Gi = ￿(x)gi. Hence in turn F1 = ￿(x)F2: Finally this gives F1=F2 independent of
c which means that we must have F linear in c;G:
F();G() are arbitrary except for smoothness, concavity and monotonicity conditions. So for example F
could be isoelastic F = (ct ￿ G(xt))￿: Two other interesting examples are
(1) u() is CARA in ct so that
u(ct;xt) = 1 ￿ exp(￿￿ct)G(xt)
4where G() is decreasing and convex. This is used in Berlo⁄a & Simmons (2003).
(2) u() is quasilinear in ct so that
u(ct;xt) = ￿ct + G(xt)
This form has been used for an intertemporal labour supply problem by in which x plays the role of a
single consumption good with CRRA preferences and c represents leisure (also see the interesting note by
Rasmussen (2006)).
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The optimisation problem factors into part that involves only xt and which is independent of the future. In





























) + ￿EtV (At+1)g
Of course more than one good may bear the impact of uncertainty so that if we partition the goods into two
groups (c;x) then decisions on goods x can be taken independently of the future i⁄within period preferences
have the form u(ct;xt) = F(￿aicit + G(xt)):
3 Non-Expected Utility
We do not actually even need time additive expected utility to generate the result. To illustrate consider a













where ut = (ct + G(xt))￿=￿: Setting the price of ct = 1 the budget constraints are
ct = Zt ￿ ￿qitxit ￿ At+1
ct+1 = (1 + r)At+1 + yt+1 ￿ ￿qit+1xit+1












so xt+1 is purely a within-state t + 1 decision and solves Gi(xt+1) = qit+1 thus giving
ut+1 = ((1 + r)At+1 + yt+1 + H(qt+1))￿=￿





(ct + G(xt))￿￿=￿ + ￿ (Et(((1 + r)At+1 + yt+1 + H(qt+1))￿￿=￿))￿=￿
i1=￿
subject to ct = Zt ￿ ￿qitxit ￿ At+1
Optimising over xt, the necessary conditions have the form
U0
t()[Gi(xt) ￿ qit] = 0
where U0
t() is the marginal welfare of lifetime utility from (??). These equations imply Gi(xt) = qit for each
i and so xt as well as xt+1 solve purely static optimisation problems. Of course that still leaves the choice
of At+1 (or equivalently ct+1) which carries all the intertemporal in￿ uence.
4 Conclusions
We have found necessary and su¢ cient conditions on preferences for all but one intertemporal decisions to
reduce to just static decisions in an intertemporal decision problem with uncertainty when there is a single
￿nancial asset. Some aspects of the preferences are general (the form of the functions F;G). We have not
explicitly allowed for random future preference shocks but from the Epstein-Zin example above it￿ s clear
that these can be included (think of random qt+1 as playing the role of preference shocks). Multiple ￿nancial
assets can also be included: each additional asset will add one set of Euler equations which must be satis￿ed
by the optimal choice of ct:
The intertemporal choice problem in general is very complex, both information and computation demands
on decisionmakers are very heavy. Given this what do decisionmakers actually do? If they happen to
have preferences like these the problem is hugely simpli￿ed. If they don￿ t then attention has focussed on
alternatives to fully ￿ edged backward induction like preference for future ￿ exibility (Kreps (1979)), scenario
planning (Rockafellar & Wets (1991)).
6A Appendix
Age CV, positives CV all obs Zero Expenditure
n 5288
Food 0:67 0:67 9
Alcohol 1:13 1:55 1940
Tobacco 0:95 2:62 4430
Clothing, footwear 1:28 1:74 1981
Household goods 2:09 2:15 297
Household services 2:54 2:58 164
Personal goods 2:08 2:25 712
Motoring 1:14 1:37 1160
Fares 2:12 3:58 3505
Leisure goods 2:27 2:43 627
Leisure services 2:58 2:64 206
Fuel 0:62 0:68 312
Table 1
Age 25 ￿ 29 40 ￿ 44 55 ￿ 59 70 ￿ 75
n 332 588 577 395
Food 0:57 0:61 :64 0:66
Alcohol 1:60 1:30 1:73 1:81
Clothing, footwear 1:35 1:48 1:64 1:82
Household goods 1:41 2:92 1:79 1:71
Household services 1:77 4:13 1:35 1:22
Personal goods 1:97 2:90 2:18 1:76
Fares 2:16 4:06 3:20 2:98
Leisure goods 1:85 2:15 2:30 1:78
Leisure services 2:23 4:32 1:93 1:98
Fuel 0:64 0:62 0:67 0:61
Table 2, CV, all observations
References
[1] Attanasio O, Low H & Sanchez-Marcos V.,(2008), Explaining Changes in Female Labour Supply in a
Life Cycle Model, American Economic Review, 98, 1517-52
[2] Berlo⁄a G & Simmons P, Unwemployment Risk, Labour Participation & Savings, (2003), Review of
Economic Studies, 70(3), 521-539
[3] Campbell J. Y. Cocco J. F., (2005), How do house prices a⁄ect consumption: Evidence from Micro
data, Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 591-621.
[4] Constantinides G. M., (1990), Habit Formation: a Resolution of the Equity Premium Puzzle, Journal
of Political Economy, 98,519-543
[5] Dreze J & Modigliani F, (1972), Consumption Decisions under Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Theory,
3, 308-335
7[6] Epstein L G & Zin S E, (1989) Substitution, Risk Aversion and the Temporal Behaviour of Consumption
and Asset Returns, Econometrica, 57(4), 283-322
[7] Gourinchas P-O. & Parker J. A., (2002), Consumption over the Life Cycle, Econometrica, 70, 47-89
[8] Klibano⁄ P, Marinacci M & Mukerji S, (2005), A Smooth Model of Decisionmaking Under Ambiguity,
Econometrica, 73,6, 1849-1892
[9] Kreps D, (1979), A Representation Theorem for "Preferences for Flexibility", Econometrica, 46, 565-578
[10] Meghir C. & Weber G, (1996) Intertemporal Nonseparability or Borrowing Restrictions? A Disaggregate
Analysis Using a US Consumption Panel Data, Econometrica, 64,5,1151-1181
[11] Rasmusen E., (2006), Quasilinearity, http://rasmusen.org/GI/new/quasilinearity.pdf
[12] Rockafellar R. T & Wets R J-B, (1991), Scenarios and Policy Evaluation in Optimisation Under Uncer-
tainty, Math of Operational Research, 16, 119-147
[13] Thaler R., (1990) Saving Fungibility and Mental Accounting, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4(1),
193-205
[14] Zeldes S. P., (1989), Consumption & Liquidity Constraints: an Empirical Investigation, Journal of
Political Economy, 97, 2, 305-346
8